立法會六題：港鐵公司物業發展 LCQ6: MTR property development

上周的立法會書面問題涉及南港島線，放上來大家參考一下。

FYI:  the Legco question concerning the MTR SIL property development

立法會六題：港鐵公司物業發展

立法會六題：港鐵公司物業發展 ＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊ 　　以下為今日（四月二十五日）在立法會會議上陳茂波議員的提問和運輸及房屋局局長鄭汝樺的答覆︰ 問題： 　　為了支持以鐵路作為香港運輸系統的骨幹，政府在政策上給予香港鐵路有限公司（下稱「港鐵公司」）多項支持，包括將鐵路沿線上蓋的物業發展權批予港鐵公司。但港鐵公司的票價調整機制卻沒有考慮港鐵公司源自物業發展權所帶來的連串收益。就此，政府可否告知本會： （一）兩鐵合併前，地下鐵路公司（下稱「地鐵公司」）取得物業發展權的地產項目為何；地鐵公司就每一項目所支付的地價是多少；將發展權批給地鐵公司時，政府據測算所得給予地鐵公司的資金差額補助是多少；地鐵公司完成發展後所得的實際收入是多少；該收入與測算中政府補助的資金差額相差多少；當中有些地產項目的部分或全部在完成後並沒有出售，而是由地鐵公司持有作出租或經營用途，該部分物業在二○一一年十二月三十一日及之前的十五年各年度為地鐵公司帶來的租金及其他收入是多少；其落成後至各年度年底時的公允價值或估值又分別是多少；並以表列出每一個項目的上述資料； （二）二○○七年地鐵公司與九廣鐵路公司（下稱「九鐵公司」）合併成為港鐵公司時，政府有否把九鐵沿線所有的上蓋物業發展權售予港鐵公司；如否，當年如何處理未有售予港鐵公司的物業發展權；如有，以表列出該等項目的地點、發展內容和規模為何；港鐵公司就每一項目支付的價錢（包括每平方呎樓面地價及地價總金額）為何；就已完成發展的該等項目，港鐵公司所得的實際收入（在扣除上述給予九鐵公司或政府的價錢後）分別是多少；就未發展的項目，每一項目現時的每平方呎估計樓面地價是多少，跟當時港鐵公司支付予九鐵公司或政府的樓面地價相差多少；就發展中但未完全落成的項目，以表列出其已發展與未發展的部分的上述相關資料；及 （三）在兩鐵合併後落實興建的每個鐵路項目的財務安排詳情（包括該項目是透過物業發展收益補助興建所需的資金差額（例如南港島線）或由政府出資興建（例如西港島線））為何；就政府批出物業發展權的項目，政府已向或估計將向港鐵公司收取的地價和已補貼或擬補貼的資金差額分別是多少，並按項目以表列出分項數字？ 答覆： 主席： 　　發展鐵路項目需要大量資本投資，雖然項目有利社會發展，但在財務上一般都是不可行或可行性偏低的。從各地的經驗來看，項目大多需要政府直接負責融資或提供資助，香港也不例外。 　　鐵路加物業發展是政府為發展新鐵路項目提供財務支持的其中一個模式。過去數十年，我們採用這個模式成功拓展了不少鐵路項目，令該些項目迅速推行，以應付市民的交通需求，並且無須與其他公共工程項目競逐資源，是個善用公共資源的安排。這個模式亦令車站、車廠與車站上蓋發展項目之間的工程銜接更為暢順，既可確保鐵路工程如期完成，亦可避免日後需要在鐵路範圍內進行上蓋物業發展工程，影響鐵路的運作。 　　就質詢的三個部分，現答覆如下： （一）在二○○○年，前地鐵有限公司（現稱「香港鐵路有限公司」；下稱「港鐵公司」）上市前，政府全資擁有該公司，亦是公司唯一的股東。政府曾就發展觀塘線、荃灣線、港島線、機場鐵路及將軍澳支線，向該公司授予物業發展權，以鐵路加物業發展融資模式興建相關的鐵路。除了滿足運輸需要，當時政府就這個安排亦有其他重要考慮，包括利用鐵路發展帶動沿線的社區發展和令該公司有能力在市場舉債發展鐵路和物業。由港鐵公司上市後至二○一○年的十年間，港鐵公司未有實施任何以鐵路加物業發展模式的鐵路項目。至於二○一一年以此方式推展的鐵路項目，我將會在問題第（三）部分解釋。 　　由一九七○年間至二○○○年港鐵公司上市前的物業發展項目帶來的出售收益、租金收入及價值，已於前地下鐵路公司二○○○年上市時考慮及結算，並反映在當時的公司市值及上市股價中。這些資料，已經詳列於港鐵公司二○○○年上市時的招股文件內。陳議員要求的資料其實有很多已反映於招股文件內。我們亦已將這些相關部分附載於附件一內，以供參考。 　　在鐵路加物業發展的融資模式下，政府及鐵路公司雙方均分擔風險與效益。港鐵公司獲批物業發展權，雖然獲得政府的財務資助，但須先自行安排融資，以支付鐵路的建築成本、營運期內的營運成本及固定資產維修和更新費用，並在日後為物業發展融資及支付土地補價。由於車站或車廠上蓋的物業發展往往只能在鐵路工程完成後，才能動工興建，估計物業項目需於鐵路項目動工後約十多年才可落成開售。因此，港鐵公司須承擔項目融資、物業市場動盪、營運鐵路責任等的長遠風險，而政府則無須面對這些風險。 （二）港鐵公司與政府為兩鐵合併商議的財務條款，其中包括為收購產業及其他有關商業利益的物業方案。該物業方案當中包括港鐵公司購入六幅當時九廣鐵路公司（下稱「九鐵公司」）物業用地的物業發展權，和九龍南線沿線當時由政府持有的兩幅物業用地。根據兩鐵合併的財務條款，港鐵公司就該八個物業發展用地的發展權向九鐵公司支付了49億1,000萬元。政府當時委任的專業估值師確認這八個物業發展用地的發展權的定價公平和合理。 　　該八幅用地的位置、目前的發展規模、內容，以及港鐵公司向政府支付的地價和平均每平方呎地價等資料載於附件二。八幅用地當中，其中三幅用地，分別是何東樓（即「御龍山」）、烏溪沙站（即「銀湖‧天峰」）以及大圍維修中心（即「名城」）的發展項目雖則仍有單位待售，卻已大致完成銷售；另外三幅用地，分別是車公廟站（即「溱岸8號」）、九龍南線柯士甸站C用地及D用地的發展商正在施工；而其餘兩幅用地，分別是大圍站及天水圍輕鐵天榮站的批地申請則正在進行當中。 　　此外，根據上述物業方案，合併後的港鐵公司取代九鐵公司作為政府的代理人，以發展西鐵沿線物業用地。換言之，西鐵沿線物業用地的物業發展權並沒有售予港鐵公司。在相關安排下，港鐵公司擔任西鐵物業發展項目的代理人，並收取相當於相關西鐵項目總銷售收益的0.75%，作為代理人的費用。 　　合併後港鐵公司的物業發展利潤，均載列於其年報當中。有關資料載於附件三，簡述如下： 二○○八年　　　39.1億元 二○○九年　　　30.3億元 二○一○年　　　32.6億元 二○一一年　　　42.3億元 （三）兩鐵合併後，我們按照與港鐵公司在二○○七年簽訂的《營運協議》，先後進行五個新鐵路項目，包括正動工的西港島線、廣深港高速鐵路（香港段）、南港島線（東段）及觀塘線延線，以及計劃今年年中動工的沙田至中環線。 　　其中，西港島線是以非經常補助金方式資助項目，獲立法會撥款向港鐵公司提供127億元的財務資助，以填補項目的資金差額，當中不涉及以物業發展權形式的財務資助。 　　廣深港高速鐵路（香港段）及沙田至中環線則以服務經營權模式推展，是政府直接向立法會申請在工務計劃項目下撥款興建，亦不涉及向港鐵公司授予物業發展權。 　 　　至於南港島線（東段）及觀塘線延線項目，則以鐵路加物業發展模式推展。經政府委託的獨立顧問詳細評估後，確定南港島線（東段）的建造成本為124億元，而觀塘線延線則為53億元。獨立顧問估算兩個項目在財務上是不可行，需要政府資助的資金差額分別為99億元及33億元。行政會議於二○一一年五月向港鐵公司批出前黃竹坑邨用地及前山谷道邨第一期用地的物業發展權作為這兩個項目的財務資助。 　　我們委聘了一個獨立顧問評定兩項物業發展的發展成本，又另外委聘兩間獨立測量公司協助評估物業價值。根據他們的評估，因成本上漲及落實的規劃參數，即使透過物業發展權資助，港鐵公司也僅可以物業發展的資助填補這兩個項目的資金差額。 　　兩幅用地的物業發展皆需要在二○一五年車站或車廠建成後，才可在上蓋動工，地政總署收到港鐵公司提出批地申請後，才遵照既定程序就港鐵公司須支付的土地補價進行估值。地政總署向港鐵公司批出土地後，會在該署網頁公開有關資料，包括港鐵公司須支付的土地補價。 　　多謝主席。 完 ２０１２年４月２５日（星期三） 香港時間１５時１６分 香港特別行政區政府新聞處(英文版)  Press Release 2012-04-25 標示關鍵字 LCQ6: MTR property development LCQ6: MTR property development ****************************** Following is a question by the Hon Paul Chan Mo-po and a reply by the Secretary for Transport and Housing, Ms Eva Cheng, in the Legislative Council today (April 25): Question: In order to support the adoption of railways as the backbone of Hong Kong's transport system, the Government gives the MTR Corporation Limited (MTRCL) various items of support, including granting to MTRCL the property development rights on top of the stations along the railway. However, MTRCL's Fare Adjustment Mechanism does not take into account the series of MTRCL's benefits arising from property development rights. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council: (a) of the real estate projects the property development rights of which were obtained by the Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC) before the rail merger; in respect of each of the projects, the land premium paid by MTRC; the amount of grant provided to MTRC by the Government based on estimates to bridge the funding gap when it granted the property development rights to MTRC; the actual revenue received by MTRC after completing the development; the difference between such revenue and the funding gap bridged by the government grant which was calculated based on estimates; the respective annual rentals and other revenues for the year ended December 31, 2011 and the 15 years before that year derived by MTRC from the properties in those real estate projects which were not sold but were partly or wholly kept by MTRC for rent or business operation purposes; the respective amounts of the fair value or valuation of these properties from the dates of completion to the end of each of the years; and set out the aforesaid information of each project in table form; (b) when MTRC merged with the Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation (KCRC) to form MTRCL in 2007, whether the Government had sold to MTRCL all property development rights on top of the stations along the Kowloon-Canton Railway; if not, how the property development rights not sold to MTRCL were dealt with in that year; if so, list the locations and the details and scales of development of such projects in table form; of the price (including the land premium per square foot of floor space and the total amount of land premium) paid by MTRCL for each project; the respective actual revenues (after deducting the aforesaid price paid to KCRC or the Government) derived by MTRCL from the completed projects; in each of the undeveloped projects, the difference between the current estimated land premium per square foot of floor space and that paid by MTRCL to KCRC or the Government at that time; set out in table form the aforesaid related information in respect of the developed and undeveloped parts of those projects which are under development but are not fully completed; and (c) of the details (including whether the funding gaps for the projects were subsidised with the returns from property development (e.g. the South Island Line) or the projects were constructed with government funding (e.g. the West Island Line)) of the funding arrangement for each railway project confirmed for construction after the rail merger; of the respective amounts of land premium received or to be received from MTRCL and the funding gap subsidised or to be subsidised in respect of the projects the property development rights of which were granted by the Government, with a breakdown in table form by project? Reply: President, Railway development projects involve substantial capital investment. Despite their benefits conducive to the development of our society, these projects are usually non-viable financially or with low financial viability. Overseas experience shows that most projects require government direct funding or other supports to take forward. Hong Kong is no exception. The Rail-plus-Property development model (R+P model) is one of the approaches adopted by the Government to provide financial support to new railway development projects. In the past decades, this approach has been used to implement a number of railway projects with success. It enables speedy implementation of the projects to meet the transport demand of the public. This arrangement optimises the use of public resources in the absence of competition with other public works projects for resource allocation. It also smoothens the interface between stations, depots and topside developments to ensure timely completion of the railway works while avoiding the need to carry out property development works within the railway areas in future which may affect railway operation. My reply to the three parts of the question is as follows: (a) Before the public listing of the then Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC) (currently named as the MTR Corporation Limited (MTRCL)) in 2000, the Government was the sole shareholder and wholly owned the company. When developing the Kwun Tong Line, Tsuen Wan Line, Island Line, Airport Railway and Tseung Kwan O Extension, the Government granted property development rights to the company to finance the corresponding railways under the R+P model. Not only to satisfy the transport demand, the Government has other crucial consideration in adopting such an arrangement. With the R+P model, the railway development spearheads the growth of local communities along the rail lines. The model also empowers the company to raise funds from the market for the railway and property developments. Since its listing, the MTRCL has not implemented any railway project under the R+P model in the decade ending 2010. Those financed under this model in 2011 are elaborated in part (c) of my reply. The sales proceeds, rental income and property value generated by the property development projects between 1970s and 2000, when the company went public, were considered, settled, and reflected in the market value and share price of the company at that time. The information was published in detail in the Initial Public Offer (IPO) prospectus of the MTRCL in 2000. Most of the information requested by Hon Chan has also been included in the IPO prospectus. We also attached the relevant pages of the prospectus at Annex 1 for reference. Under the R+P model, the Government and the railway company share the risks and benefits. In spite of the government funding via the grant of property development rights, the MTRCL has to arrange on its own the necessary funding beforehand to settle the construction costs of the railways, the operation expense and fixed asset replacement costs during the operation period, and later to pay the expenses on property development and land premium. As property developments above stations or depots cannot start until the completion of the railway projects, it is estimated that such developments can only be completed for sale about ten odd years after the commencement of railway construction. As a result, the MTRCL has to bear long-term risks in financing the railway projects, fluctuations in the property market as well as the operation responsibilities of the railways while the Government is spared. (b) The financial terms negotiated between the MTRCL and the Government for the rail merger include, inter alia, the property package for acquisition of property and other commercial interests. The property package covers the purchase from the MTRCL the property development rights in respect of six property sites held by the then Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation (KCRC), plus two property sites along Kowloon Southern Link held by Government at that time. According to the financial terms of the rail merger, the MTRCL paid the KCRC $4.91 billion for the development rights over these eight sites. The professional property valuation consultant commissioned by the Government at that time had confirmed that the pricing of the development rights over these eight property development sites was fair and reasonable. The information of these eight sites including their location, current development scope, content, land premia paid by MTRCL to the Government as well as land premium per square foot are set out in Annex 2. Out of the eight property sites, flat sales of three developments comprising Ho Tung Lau (i.e. The Palazzo), Wu Kai Sha Station (i.e. Lake Silver) and Tai Wai Maintenance Centre (i.e. Festival City) are almost completed with some flats remain unsold. Construction works are being carried out by respective developers on another three sites comprising Che Kung Temple Station (i.e. The Riverpark), and Site C and Site D of Kowloon Southern Link's Austin Station. Land grant applications for the remaining two sites, i.e. Tai Wai Station and Tin Shui Wai Light Rail Tin Wing Stop, are underway. In addition, under the above-mentioned property package, the MTRCL has replaced the KCRC as the agent of the Government after the merger for developing the property sites along the West Rail Line. In other words, the property development rights for the sites concerned have not been sold to the MTRCL. Under the relevant arrangements, the MTRCL only acts as the agent of West Rail property development projects and receives an agent's fee equivalent to 0.75% of the gross return on sales from these projects. The post-merger property development profits of the MTRCL are presented in its annual reports. Relevant information is detailed in Annex 3 and briefly set out as follows: Year 2008 $3.91 billion Year 2009 $3.03 billion Year 2010 $3.26 billion Year 2011 $4.23 billion (c) Since the merger, we have implemented five new railway projects under the Operating Agreement signed with the MTRCL in 2007. They are the West Island Line (WIL); Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link (Hong Kong Section) (XRL); South Island Line (East) (SIL(E)) and Kwun Tong Line Extension (KTE) which are under construction; and the Shatin to Central Link (SCL) of which the construction is scheduled to commence in mid-2012. Among these projects, the WIL is funded by a capital grant. The Legislative Council (LegCo) has approved a provision of $12.7 billion for the MTRCL to bridge the funding gap. Financial support by means of granting property development rights is not involved. Both the XRL and the SCL are implemented under the concession approach. The Government seeks funding for the construction of both projects directly from the LegCo under the appropriate public works programmes. Thus, the grant of property development rights to the MTRCL is not involved in these projects either. The SIL(E) and the KTE are implemented under the R+P model. After a detailed assessment conducted by an independent consultant commissioned by the Government, it confirmed that the capital cost of the SIL(E) is $12.4 billion while that of the KTE is $5.3 billion. The independent consultant considered that both projects were financially non-viable, and that funding support from the Government was required to bridge the funding gaps of $9.9 billion and $3.3 billion respectively. In May 2011, the Executive Council approved granting to the MTRCL the property development rights for the ex-Wong Chuk Hang Estate site and ex-Valley Road Estate Phase 1 site as the funding support for developing the two railway projects. We have commissioned an independent consultant to assess the development costs of the two property developments, and engaged another two independent surveying companies to help assess their property values. Based on their assessments, the funding assistance to be offered by the property developments may barely bridge the estimated funding gap in the light of the increases in development costs and implementation of the latest planning parameters. The topside property developments of the two sites will not be able to commence until the stations and depot concerned have completed in 2015. The Lands Department (LD) will assess the land premium payable by the MTRCL according to established procedures only after it has received the company's application for land grant. After granting the land to the MTRCL, the LD will publish the relevant information, including the land premium payable by the company, on its website. Thank you. Ends/Wednesday, April 25, 2012 Issued at HKT 15:09